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Abstract
Most of the expansion of global trade during the last three decades has
been of the North-South kind – between capital-abundant developed
and labour-abundant developing countries. Based on this observation,
I argue that the recent growth of world trade is best understood from
a factor-proportions perspective. I present novel evidence documenting
that differences in capital-labour ratios across countries have increased
in the wake of two shocks to the global economy: i) the opening up of
China and ii) financial globalisation and the resulting upstream capi-
tal flows towards capital-abundant regions. I analyse their impact on
specialisation and the volume of trade in a dynamic model which com-
bines factor-proportions trade in goods with international trade in fi-
nancial assets. Calibrating this model, I find that it can account for
60% of world trade growth between 1980 and 2007. It is also capable of
predicting international investment patterns which are consistent with
the data.
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1 Introduction
The rapid growth of world trade has been one of the most striking develop-
ments in the global economy over the last three decades. Figure 1 shows that
the traded share of world output rose by 8 percentage points between 1980
and 2007, from 14% to 22%. This surge follows a period from the mid-1970s
to the late 1980s during which the growth in global trade appeared to have
levelled off, and it exceeds the increase which accompanied the GATT rounds
of the 1960s and 1970s. Most of the recent rise in world trade has taken place
between capital-abundant countries − the “North” − and capital-scarce coun-
tries − the “South” −, as Figure 2 illustrates.1 Starting from this observation,
this paper puts forward the view that factor-proportions differences are the
key to explaining the expansion of global trade since 1980.
Earlier attempts to explain world trade growth in the post-War era have
focused on the impact of tariff declines among a relatively homogenous group
of countries. Yet in this context, as extensively documented by Yi (2003),
the modest decline in average tariff rates among the largest economies implies
that trade models cannot match the nature and extent of the growth in world
trade during the last 30 years, which poses a “quantitative and qualitative
puzzle” for international trade theory. Subsequent attempts to determine why
world trade has increased have struggled to account for the magnitude of the
phenomenon.
In this paper I argue that world trade has grown because the group of
open economies has become less homogenous. In particular, I document that
differences between the capital-labour ratios of the largest trading countries
have increased due to the opening up of China − a large and very labour-
abundant economy − and the pattern of net financial flows from capital-scarce
to capital-abundant countries, sometimes referred to as “global imbalances” or
“South-North capital flows”. Classical trade models predict that countries
export in industries which make use of their relatively abundant production
factors, and that factor-endowment differences give rise to gains from interna-
tional commodity trade. I calibrate such a model using estimates of countries’
endowments of human and physical capital and show that it can explain nearly
90% of the growth in North-South trade between 1980 and 2007, amounting
to more than half of the overall growth in world trade.
Figure 3 depicts the evolution of the world distribution of capital stocks
per effective worker, henceforth referred to as “capital-labour ratios” or “K/H-
ratios” for brevity, by plotting the trade-weighted average factor abundance −
1Figure 2 is based on the regional trading patterns between 1980 and 2007 among 27
large economies, accounting for 85% of global output during this period.
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a measure of the dispersion of capital-labour ratios among open economies.2
The figure highlights that the dispersion of factor proportions has increased
steadily (solid line), but that this increase would not have occurred if China’s
share of global trade had remained unchanged since 1980 (dotted line). It also
shows that the increase would have been significantly smaller in financial au-
tarky (dashed line).3 Correspondingly, my calibration suggests that 60% of the
growth in North-South trade can be explained as a result of the opening up of
labour-abundant China, while a further 17% are due to financial globalisation
and the resulting flow of capital to capital-abundant regions.
China’s trade liberalisation − in accordance with the program of “reform
and opening up” initiated by the Communist Party of China under Deng
Xiaoping in 1978 − is generally viewed as an exogenous policy shock. It
merits special consideration because its scale and global impact are unique
in the period 1980-2007.4 Its significance for any factor-proportions-based
view of international goods trade derives from China’s sheer size and labour-
abundance. Although China’s comparative advantage in labour-intensive in-
dustries is widely acknowledged,5 to the best of my knowledge this paper pro-
vides the first quantitative assessment of China’s contribution to the growth
in world trade from a factor-proportions perspective.
While my main objective is to provide an explanation for the growth in
world trade during the last three decades, the prominent role of China in
my calibrations implies that this paper also touches on the issue of China’s
economic transition. Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2011) document that
China’s economic transformation in the last 30 years has been characterised
by high output growth, reallocation within the manufacturing sector, sus-
tained returns to capital, and a large trade surplus. They construct a one-
good model with heterogeneous firms and credit market frictions to account
for these stylised facts. My model predicts China’s transition to proceed
in a similar manner, albeit for different reasons: factor-proportions trade in
goods delivers output growth and sustained capital returns, while a large trade
2The trade-weighted average factor abundance is calculated as
∑
c
∣∣∣KctKt − HctHt ∣∣∣ Xct+MctXt+Mt ,
where Kct is country c’s stock of physical capital, Hct its stock of human capital and Xct
and Mct represent the value of its exports and imports, respectively. I drop the subscript c
for world variables. Details on data sources and construction are provided in Appendix A1.
3I estimate counterfactual “financial autarky” capital stocks by cumulating countries’
gross domestic savings, rather than the usual investments, since domestic investment equals
saving in financially closed economies. The assumptions underlying the construction of this
data are discussed in greater detail in Appendix A1.
4Since 1990 China has slashed its average import tariff by 25 percentage points − more
than any other large economy. The value of its imports relative to world GDP has risen
from 0.2% in 1980 to 2.1% in 2007 and is now similar to Germany’s.
5See, for example, Rodrik (2006) and Amiti and Freund (2010).
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surplus emerges on account of agents’ desire to mitigate domestic investment
risk through foreign asset purchases.
The pattern of South-North capital flows − and the resulting increase in
factor-proportions differences − constitutes a well-established puzzle for the
theory of international finance.6 Traditional one-good models of international
investment have tended to emphasise locally diminishing returns to capital
as the main motive for international financial flows. Barring a strong pos-
itive correlation between savings rates and total factor productivities, such
models would predict capital to flow from capital-abundant to capital-scarce
regions in search of higher returns, thereby reducing factor-proportions differ-
ences. I allow for international asset trade in my model and demonstrate that
the increased prevalence of factor-proportions trade may explain why it has
increased factor-proportions differences, contrary to the conventional view.
Trade theory has established that, under well-defined conditions, trade in
goods with different factor intensities may eliminate local diminishing returns
to production factors, and thus the main theoretical reason for capital to flow
from North to South. Suppose therefore that instead of return differentials,
diversification and risk sharing are the dominant motives for international asset
trade. In that case, barring a strong negative correlation between savings rates
and country risk, capital should flow from risky to safe regions which may
exacerbate factor-proportions differences, raising specialisation and trade.
Empirical tests verify that country-specific investment risk has been an im-
portant determinant of international investment patterns over the last three
decades. In a panel of the 27 large economies, a measure of country risk −
based on historical country risk scores from the Political Risk Services Group
(PRSG) − is strongly and negatively correlated with the GDP-share of in-
vestment after controlling for domestic savings and country and time fixed
effects (see Figure 4 and the formal regressions in Appendix A2). As part of
my calibration exercise, I show that a model in which factor-proportions trade
eliminates local diminishing returns and financial globalisation allows agents
to hedge idiosyncratic investment risk can match the patterns of international
asset trade remarkably well.7
My paper adds to a long literature on the quantitative implications of
6See, among others, Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian (2006), Gourinchas and Jeanne
(2006) and Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2008)
7Antras and Caballero (2009) and Jin (2009) are two recent attempts to explain South-
North capital flows in the context of a Heckscher-Ohlin model. My model relates more closely
to the “portfolio approach” to the current account − pioneered by Kraay and Ventura (2003),
Ventura (2003) and Kraay et al. (2005). I expand on their partial-equilibrium international
portfolio model by embedding it in a many-good general-equilibrium framework in which
local diminishing returns disappear endogenously as a result of factor-proportions trade in
commodities.
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international trade models for the level and growth of world trade. The de-
velopment of the so-called “new” trade theory by Krugman (1979), Lancaster
(1980) and Helpman (1981) was motivated in part by the failure of traditional,
comparative-advantage-based models to explain the volume of world trade and
its concentration among a small group of industrialised nations. Helpman
(1987) demonstrates that, beyond this, new trade theory has implications for
trade growth, linking it to the similarity of countries’ incomes. However, sub-
sequent work by Hummels and Levinsohn (1995), Baier and Bergstrand (2001)
and Bergoeing and Kehoe (2003) has uncovered little evidence that this chan-
nel has played a quantitatively important role in the recent growth of world
trade, shifting attention towards declining trade frictions.
Yi (2003) shows that the decline in world tariffs in the last decades of the
20th century has been too small to match the observed growth in trade using a
Ricardian or new trade model with plausible assumptions about the elasticity
of substitution between goods. He attempts to explain this puzzle as the result
of an increase in vertical specialisation, whereby goods cross borders several
times during the production process, but his model leaves at least half of world
trade growth unaccounted for. My paper is complimentary with Yi’s insofar as
he assumes the pattern of vertical specialisation to be determined by classical
comparative advantage due to productivity differences. My calibrations also
assume a comparative-advantage motive for trade but show that horizontal
specialisation alone, driven by factor-proportions differences, can explain a
substantial part of the recent growth in world trade.
A recent paper by Cuñat and Maffezzoli (2007) is most closely related to
the present work. The authors study the growth of U.S. trade from a dy-
namic factor-proportions perspective. In their setting trade integration raises
the return to capital in capital-abundant countries and lowers it in capital-
scarce countries, thus eliciting more capital accumulation in the former, and
reducing it in the latter. They suggest that this dynamic implication of tariff
reductions can explain why small tariff reductions have had a large impact on
U.S. trade with the rest of the world. Unlike Cuñat and Maffezzoli (2007), I
study the growth in global rather than U.S. trade and analyse the impact of an
asymmetric increase in the trade openness of capital-scarce regions. Moreover,
I dispense with their assumption of financial autarky, showing that interna-
tional capital flows have played a significant part in increasing specialisation
and trade.8
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes
8My estimates suggest that the U.S. capital stock in 2007 would have been 15% lower
in financial autarky. In fact, without capital inflows the U.S. investment rate would have
declined over the last 30 years − contrary to the prediction of Cuñat and Maffezzoli (2007).
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the theoretical model and shows how it can be applied to study the impact
on factor-proportions trade of i) the arrival of a new, labour-abundant coun-
try and ii) the occurrence of financial globalisation. Section 3 calibrates the
model to real-world data in order assess how much of the growth in North-
South trade over the last three decades it can explain. It also considers the
empirical realism of the model-implied determinants of international capital
flows. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
Below I outline a tractable general equilibrium model to illustrate the relation-
ship between capital-labour ratios, the patterns of trade and the traded share
of world output. The dynamic nature of the model allows me to examine the
determinants of capital accumulation under different assumptions about the
feasibility of cross-border asset trades.
Throughout, I emphasise the Heckscher-Ohlin view of international com-
modity trade: differences in regional factor proportions are a source of com-
parative advantage. Different regions of the world trade in K-intensive and
H-intensive intermediate goods, and regions export the good which uses their
abundant factor intensively. I impose assumptions that guarantee that com-
modity trade equalises factor prices and derive an expression which relates the
traded share of world output to the distribution of factor endowments. I then
proceed to analyse two cases of interest for my subsequent calibrations: the
arrival of a new country (in Section 2.2) and the impact of financial globali-
sation, modelled as the removal of all barriers to international asset trade (in
Section 2.3).
The model highlights that the stylised facts described in the previous sec-
tion can be understood from the perspective of a neoclassical, frictionless world
hit by two exogenous shocks. First, a labour-abundant country − China −
has opened up to international goods trade. Second, financial globalisation has
occurred and asset trades between small (in terms of the size of their effec-
tive workforce) but safe regions and large but risky regions have exacerbated
factor-proportions differences.
2.1 Basic Model
2.1.1 Endowments and Preferences
Consider a world consisting of large regions, c = 1, ..., C, and inhabited by two
overlapping generations, the young and the old. Generations in region c have
8
constant size Lc. In youth, agents in c are endowed with hc units of human
capital which they supply inelastically in their regional labour market, at the
given wage rate wct. Young agents also receive profits Πct from the economy’s
firms. A fraction 1 − Sc of these agents is impatient and derives utility only
from consumption in youth. A fraction Sc is patient and derives utility only
from consumption in old age. At t, the region’s aggregate savings, Bct, and
consumption, Cct, are thus given by:
Bct = Sc (wctHc + Πct) , (1)
Cct = (1− Sc) (wctHc + Πct) + rctBct−1, (2)
where rct is the rate of return on savings in c at t and Hc ≡ hcLc.
2.1.2 Production
Each region c produces final goods which are used for consumption and in-
vestment:
Cct + Ict = Qct, (3)
where Ict denotes aggregate investment in c at t and Qct represents the to-
tal output of final goods. Final goods are Cobb-Douglas composites of two
intermediate goods:
Qct = θQ
α
cKtQ
1−α
cHt with α ∈ (0, 1) , (4)
where Qcjt is the input of intermediate good j ∈ {K,H} used in final pro-
duction, and θ is a productivity parameter. Intermediate goods are assembled
using two factors of production − physical capital, Kct, and human capital,
Hc − according to
QcKt = KcKt, (5)
QcHt = HcHt. (6)
In words, production of the intermediate good of theK-type uses only physical
capital, while production of the intermediate good of the H-type uses only
human capital.
Intermediate-good and factor markets are perfectly competitive everywhere.
However, final goods in each c can be produced by two types of firms: a compet-
itive fringe of firms with productivity θ = 1, or a monopolist which is uniquely
capable of operating the superior technology θ = 1
1−τ , with τ ∈ (0, 1). In equi-
librium, due to the unit elasticity of final demand, final goods in each region
are supplied by the monopolist at a price equal to the marginal cost of firms
9
in the competitive fringe, and τ can be interpreted as the profit margin.9
2.1.3 Savings, Investment and Capital Formation
Agents in c have exclusive access to an investment technology which allows
them to turn Ict units of investment in t into Kct+1 units of capital in t + 1,
according to
Kct+1 = Act+1Ict, (7)
where Act+1 is stochastic with
Et (Act+1) = 1
V ar (Act+1) = σ
2
c
Cov (Act+1, Ac′t+1) = 0 ∀ c′ 6= c
. (8)
Capital depreciates fully in one period.
Since the final consumption good is assumed to be perishable, agents can
only transfer consumption to the future by making risky investments in physi-
cal capital stock. Investment risk is perfectly idiosyncratic.10 I shall therefore
refer to σc as a measure of c’s country risk.
2.1.4 Goods Trade and Factor Price Equalisation
I introduce commodity trade between different regions by assuming that in-
termediate goods are perfectly tradable, while factors and final goods cannot
be traded. For now − in common with most trade models − I do not allow
agents in c to trade assets with residents of other regions, so that domestic
capital investments remain their only means of transferring consumption to
the future.
The source of gains from commodity trade in the present model are differ-
ences in factor proportions. Given world prices, countries choose the produc-
tion vector {QcKt, QcHt} which suits their relative endowment of production
factors. By the force of the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem, this leads K-abundant
regions to export the K-intermediate and import the H-intermediate, while
H-abundant regions do the reverse.
Since intermediate goods can be traded freely,
Pcjt = Pjt ∀ c and j ∈ {K,H} .
9The parameter τ will be used in the calibrations in Section 3, where it will represent
the share of income from non-traded production. However, for the remainder of this section
there is nothing lost by letting τ equal zero and assuming that final-good firms are also
perfectly competitive.
10This assumption is not crucial but greatly simplifies the subsequent analysis.
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Defining Pct as region c’s aggregate price level, synonymous with the price of
consumption and investment, intermediate goods trade implies
Pct ≡
(
PcKt
α
)α(
PcHt
1− α
)1−α
= Pt ∀ c.
I impose the normalisation Pt = 1 and drop the subscript c for all world
variables.
It is a well-established feature of models of factor-proportions trade that
trade in goods may also equalise the return to production factors across re-
gions even when factors themselves cannot move to exploit potential return
differentials. This is referred to as the Factor Price Equalisation (FPE) the-
orem. In the present setting, the assumed non-substitutability of capital and
labour in the production of K- and H-intermediates ensures that commodity
trade always equalises factor prices, irrespective of the given distribution of
factor endowments.11
Since FPE applies,
Qt = K
α
t H
1−α, (9)
Πt = τQt, (10)
rct = rt = (1− τ)αQt
Kt
∀ c, (11)
wct = wt = (1− τ) (1− α) Qt
H
∀ c, (12)
Kt+1 =
C∑
c=1
Act+1Ict =
C∑
c=1
Act+1scQct, (13)
where sc ≡ [(1− τ) (1− α) + τ ]Sc. The world economy behaves like a Solow
model while the aggregate output of each region c is described by
Qct =
[
α
Kct
Kt
+ (1− α) Hc
H
]
Qt. (14)
11See Ventura (2005) for a comprehensive discussion of the necessary conditions for FPE
to arise as a result of trade in commodities. While the possibility of trade-induced factor
price equalisation is a feature of many trade models, the question whether it is also a feature
of reality has not yet been answered conclusively. Trefler (1993) documents the empirical
validity of a conditional version of the FPE theorem. More recently, Caselli and Feyrer
(2007) show that, despite large differences in capital-labour ratios and the absence of large
capital flows from capital-abundant to capital-scarce regions, the marginal product of capital
does not appear to differ greatly across countries.
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2.1.5 The Patterns of Trade
Define Mcjt as the value of region c’s net imports of the j-intermediate. Since
trade is balanced
McHt = (1− τ)α (1− α)
(
Kct
Kt
− Hc
H
)
Qt = −McKt. (15)
So long as Kct/Kt − Hc/H > 0, c will be a net importer of the H-good and
a net exporter of the K-good. If Kct/Kt −Hc/H < 0, the reverse will be the
case. Regions with a larger |Kct/Kt −Hc/H| produce proportionally more of
the intermediate good of which they are a net exporter, and less of the other
intermediate good, giving rise to larger net trade flows between such regions
and the rest of the world. This is the classic Rybczynski theorem.
Traditional trade theory takes the distribution of Kct and Hc as given and
analyses the resulting patterns of imports and exports. I shall go one step
further by highlighting the deeper roots of the observed distribution of factor
endowments. Two extreme cases are of particular interest.
Let s =
∑
c scHc/H be the world savings rate. Assume sc ≈ s and σc is
large for all c. Then, ∣∣∣∣KctKt − HcH
∣∣∣∣ ≈
∣∣∣∣∣ Act∑
cAct
Hc
H
− 1
∣∣∣∣∣ HcH . (16)
Under this assumption, the pattern of trade is determined purely by luck.
Regions which receive large positive investment shocks relative to the world
average will be capital-abundant and export the capital-intensive good, while
regions which receive small shocks will be capital-scarce and export the labour-
intensive good. Moreover, as export patterns are essentially random, regions
whose exports are capital-intensive in one generation may supply the world
with labour-intensive products in the next. Clearly this view of the funda-
mental forces behind export patterns is of limited empirical appeal. I shall
therefore focus on an alternative case.
Assume that sc differs across countries and σc ≈ 0. Then,∣∣∣∣KctKt − HcH
∣∣∣∣ ≈ ∣∣∣scs − 1∣∣∣ HcH . (17)
Under this assumption, the pattern of exports is determined by savings be-
haviour. High-savings regions will accumulate large capital stocks relative to
low-savings regions and export capital-intensive products. Low-savings regions
will export labour-intensive products. This is the view of the fundamental
causes of differences in capital-labour ratios implicit in most traditional mod-
12
els of factor-proportions trade. In Section 2.3, I will show that it crucially de-
pends on the assumption of financial autarky. Once international asset trades
are feasible, the determinants of trading patterns are fundamentally altered.
2.1.6 The Traded Share of World Output
While the model predicts region c’s net imports and net exports, gross trade
flows are indeterminate. To pin down the latter, I assume that positive but
infinitesimal transport costs cause agents to minimise gross trade flows− which
are then equal to net flows − and I will refer to “imports/exports” and “net
imports/exports” interchangeably from now on.
Based on (15), the traded share of world output is∑
c (|McKt|+ |McHt|)
2Qt
= (1− τ)α (1− α)
∑
c∈C
∣∣∣∣KctKt − HcH
∣∣∣∣ . (18)
Equation (18) will be crucial in the remainder of the paper. It shows that the
larger the differences between regional shares in the world stocks of physical
and human capital and, hence, the more varied the factor-content of regions’
industrial production, the larger will be the overall volume of trade.
2.2 Opening Up of a New Country
2.2.1 A Labour-Abundant Country Opens Up
Imagine there is a country called China which remains closed off from inter-
national goods markets. Normalising the final-good price level in China to 1,
its output at t is given by
QChina,t = K
α
China,tH
1−α
China. (19)
While China remains in autarky, the traded share of world output is∑
c (|McKt|+ |McHt|)
2 (Qt +QChina,t)
=
(1− τ)α (1− α)
∑
c∈C
∣∣∣∣KctKt − HcH
∣∣∣∣
[
1 +
(
KChina,t
Kt
)α(
HChina
H
)1−α]−1
, (20)
where C now denotes the set of open regions, and Kt and Ht represent their
aggregate stocks of physical and human capital at t. Suppose further that
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China is a labour-abundant country, i.e.
KChina,t
Kt +KChina,t
<
HChina
H +HChina
. (21)
In the remainder of this section, I will analyse the impact on the patterns
of trade and the traded share of world output if China emerges from complete
autarky at t and begins to trade freely in intermediate goods with other regions
of the world.
2.2.2 Impact on the Patterns of Trade
Clearly, the opening up of China has an impact on world trading patterns.
China itself will be an importer of the K-intermediate and an exporter of the
H-intermediate, which follows directly from (15) and (21).
Consider now the impact on trade in another country called Japan, for
which
KJapan,t
Kt
− HJapan
H
> 0, (22)
i.e. Japan is capital-abundant. For Japan,∣∣∣∣KJapan,tKt − HJapanH
∣∣∣∣− ∣∣∣∣ KJapan,tKt +KChina,t − HJapanH +HChina
∣∣∣∣ > 0,
which is a direct consequence of (21) and (22): the opening of China makes
Japan more capital-abundant relative to the group of trading countries, caus-
ing it to import more of the H-intermediate.
By contrast, consider what happens to trade in a third country called
Indonesia, for which
KIndonesia,t
Kt
− HIndonesia
H
< 0, (23)
i.e. Indonesia is labour-abundant. For this country,∣∣∣∣KIndonesia,tKt − HIndonesiaH
∣∣∣∣− ∣∣∣∣ KIndonesia,tKt +KChina,t − HIndonesiaH +HChina
∣∣∣∣ Q 0.
The opening up of China makes Indonesia less labour-abundant relative to
all other trading countries, causing it to exports less of the H-intermediate. If
Indonesia remains labour-abundant despite China’s arrival, the overall effect
is a reduction in Indonesia’s trade with the rest of the world. However, there
may be another labour-abundant country − call it Korea − which is similar
to, but less labour-abundant than, Indonesia and which may become capital-
abundant as a result of China’s opening. This country may experience a fall,
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a rise or no change in its trade with the rest of the world.
China’s integration into the global economy thus increases K-exporters’
trade with the rest of the world, but has an ambiguous impact on countries
which used to export the H-good before China’s arrival.
2.2.3 Impact on World Trade
The change in the traded share of world output due to China’s opening is
given by
4 ln
∑
c (|McKt|+ |McHt|)
2Qt
=
= ln
∑
c
∣∣∣ KctKt+KChina,t − HcH+HChina ∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣ KChina,tKt+KChina,t − HChinaHt+HChina ∣∣∣∑
c
∣∣∣KctKt − HcH ∣∣∣
− ln (Kt +KChina,t)
α (H +HChina)
1−α
Kαt H
1−α +KαChina,tH
1−α
China
, (24)
where the second term is unambiguously negative, due to Jensen’s inequality,
and the first term may be positive or negative.
For China’s opening to increase the traded share of world output, the first
term of equation (24) needs to be positive and large, which will be the case
if the regions in C have relatively similar factor endowments and China is
sufficiently labour-abundant. As the calibrations in Section 3 show, this is
a good characterisation of the context in which China’s opening up did take
place during the last three decades.
2.3 Financial Globalisation
2.3.1 International Asset Trade and Country Risk
Section 2.1.5 illustrates that, if investment risk is small, savings behaviour
is the main determinant of capital accumulation and export specialisation in
financial autarky. Yet in the face of the large and rising volume of international
capital flows observed during the last three decades, this view of the causes of
specialisation appears increasingly dated. The panel regressions in Appendix
A2 suggest that the savings retention coefficient among large economies was
as low as 0.5 in in the period 1980-2007, and that perceptions of country risk
were a potentially important source of countries’ ability to attract investment
finance in increasingly global capital markets. In the light of this, I now
analyse the determinants of capital-labour ratios − and the resulting patterns
of trade − when domestic savings no longer need to be invested exclusively in
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domestic assets, and country-specific investment risk provides a strong motive
for international risk sharing.
The most widespread view of the motive for international capital flows,
based on macroeconomic models with a single tradable good, emphasises di-
minishing returns to capital. In this view, the return to capital investments
is generally higher in regions with low capital-labour ratios, and capital flows
from capital-abundant to capital-scarce regions in search of these higher re-
turns. Unless regional factor productivities are strongly positively correlated
with region’s autarky capital stocks, the effect of international capital flows
should be to reduce the dispersion of world capital-labour ratios. While this
explanation for cross-border capital movements has considerable theoretical
appeal, it has been known since at least Lucas (1990) that it is at odds with
the empirical pattern of international financial flows.
The model outlined above provides an explanation why local diminishing
returns to capital may be weak in open economies, even if the marginal prod-
uct of capital in aggregate production is declining in the installed capital stock:
once capital is installed in a given location, the possibility of trading commodi-
ties in international goods markets may substitute for capital movements in
equalising the marginal product of capital across different regions. With local
diminishing returns thus out of the picture, the following will stress a different
motive for international asset trade: the desire to share country-specific risk.
So far, it has been assumed that domestic capital constitutes the only
store of value for the patient young in region c. This has made it unneces-
sary to specify how such agents might allocate their funds between competing
investment opportunities. In this section I permit agents to trade freely in
state-contingent assets across borders which allows them, indirectly, to access
the investment technologies of different regions. In doing so, I assume that the
patient young choose mean-variance efficient asset portfolios,12 maximising
Et (Ct+1)− 1
2
γV ar (Ct+1) with γ ≥ 0, (25)
where γ is the parameter of relative risk aversion.
Suppose the number of countries, C, is large. Then, since country risk is
perfectly idiosyncratic,
Kt+1 = It = Bt = sQt,
12This behavioural assumption is common in modern finance, and provides a good approx-
imation to expected utility maximisation if the distribution of asset returns is characterised
well by its first two moments. See Hirshleifer and Riley (1992) for a discussion of the
relationship between expected-utility maximization and mean-variance analysis.
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i.e. the evolution of the world capital stock is deterministic. This implies that
rt+1 = α
(
H
sQt
)1−α
,
so that all uncertainty about the return to investment in a given c arises from
realisation of the local investment shock.
Young residents of region c in period t are willing to supply a state-
contingent asset that promises rt+1Act+1 units of consumption in t + 1 at
price 1 perfectly elastically. The reason is that they can hedge any amount of
such claims by investing in a corresponding amount of domestic capital, also
at price 1. It is easy to show that the possibility of buying and selling C of
these regional assets exhausts all desirable asset trades in the world economy
described here. Let φcc′ denote the share of savings of the patient young in c
invested in assets of region c′. The patient young solve:
max
{φcc′}Cc′=1
Et
(
rt+1Bct
∑
c′
Ac′t+1φ
c
c′
)
− 1
2
γV ar
(
rt+1Bct
∑
c′
Ac′t+1φ
c
c′
)
= rt+1Bct − 1
2
γ (rt+1Bct)
2
∑
c′
(σc′φ
c
c′)
2
s.t. ∑
c′
φcc′ = 1.
Note that, while the final consumption good itself cannot be traded across re-
gions, residents of region c can fulfil a promise to supply 1 unit of consumption
to foreigners in a given state by supplying the necessary quantities of perfectly
tradable intermediate goods to assemble 1 unit of final good in that state. This
may require within-period factor-proportions trade with a third party before
the required bundle of K- and H-good can be shipped to the final claimant.
2.3.2 The Pattern of International Capital Flows
Since the patient young in all regions face the same optimisation problem, it
follows that
Ict
Bt
= φc =
1
σ2c
(∑
c′
1
σ2c′
)−1
. (26)
Investment in region c thus depends negatively on c’s country risk relative to a
measure of world risk. This finding is more general than the specific choice of
objective function and the assumed return distribution would seem to suggest:
given identical return expectations, any risk-averse agent will favour safer over
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riskier assets in their portfolio, but will invest in assets of different risk classes
if this provides hedging benefits.13
Region c is a net recipient of international capital flows if
1
σ2c
(∑
c′
1
σ2c′
)−1
>
sc
Hc
H
s
. (27)
Let us consider the example of a world in which factor-proportions trade is
prevalent, regional savings rates are similar but the safest regions are small
(in terms of Hc/H). In this world, financial globalisation should be accom-
panied by capital flows from capital-scarce to capital-abundant countries as
well as large and persistent net foreign asset positions. As Caballero, Farhi
and Gourinchas (2008) have shown, among others, this is fairly accurate de-
scription of the recent pattern of international capital flows. In Section 3.3
I will assess whether my model can deliver predictions about international
investment patterns which are consistent with the data.
2.3.3 Impact on the Patterns of Trade
Consider now the following thought experiment. Suppose that for all t < t¯
regions had been able to trade in intermediate varieties but not in final goods
or factors, nor in financial assets. This is the world described in Sections
2.1 and 2.2. Assume now that in period t¯ all costs and frictions impeding
international financial transactions disappear and global asset markets become
fully integrated.
The feasibility of international asset trade implies that commodity trade
no longer needs to be balanced for any c or t ≥ t¯. Defining
−NXct ≡McHt +McKt (28)
and noting that
rtKct + wtHc + Πct = Cct + Ict +NXct, (29)
13In the limiting case in which σc → 0 ∀ c investment patterns are indeterminate.
Mundell (1957) first showed that net financial flows across borders are indeterminate if
factor-proportions trade equalises factor returns and return differentials are the only incen-
tive for international asset trade. To my knowledge, Grossman and Razin (1984) constitutes
the only other paper to point out that the “substitutability” between commodity trade and
capital flows in Heckscher-Ohlin models may break down if uncertainty is introduced into
the model. However, their paper does not explore the dynamic macroeconomic implications
of this possibility.
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it can be shown that for all t ≥ t¯
|McKt|+ |McHt|
2Qt
=
1
2
∣∣∣∣(1− τ)α (1− α)(KctKt − HcH
)
+ α
NXct
Qt
∣∣∣∣
+
1
2
∣∣∣∣(1− τ)α (1− α)(KctKt − HcH
)
− (1− α) NXct
Qt
∣∣∣∣ . (30)
Equation (30) highlights that the presence of trade imbalances may obscure
or reinforce the relationship between a region’s true comparative advantage
and its export-import patterns, depending on the values of α and NXct. By
way of example, consider the case of a capital-abundant region (Kct/Kt >
Hc/H) which is a large net importer (NXct < 0) and let α be close to 1.
While the region’s production will be geared towards the K-intermediate, its
net imports − due, for example, to net capital inflows − also cause it to
consume disproportionately more of the K-good. This reduces its exports in
the K-sector while leaving its H-imports almost unchanged, and it reduces
the sum of its exports and import overall.
The reverse would be true i) if c were a net exporter (NXct > 0) or ii)
if α were close to 0. In these cases, the presence of a trade imbalance would
increase the region’s trade with the rest of the world by i) increasing the
region’s exports of the good in which it has a comparative advantage or ii)
increasing the region’s imports of the good in which it has a comparative
disadvantage.
Irrespective of the impact of trade imbalances on export-import patterns,
capital-abundant regions will continue to produce relatively moreK-intermediates
than H-intermediates, and labour-abundant regions will do the reverse. Yet
the determinants of capital-abundance or -scarcity are changed by the nature
of international asset trades: assuming, once again, that the absolute size of
investment shocks is small (σc ≈ 0), then
Kct
Kt
− Hc
H
≈ 1
σ2c
(∑
c′
1
σ2c′
)−1
− Hc
H
. (31)
With factor-price equalising commodity trade and fully integrated interna-
tional asset markets, savings rates are no longer the most relevant underlying
determinant of the patterns of production and trade. Instead, relatively safe
regions receive the largest share of capital investments out of the sum of world
savings and, as a result, these regions will produce relatively more capital-
intensive products.
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2.3.4 Impact on World Trade
Note that if α = 1/2 and
|NXct| < 1− τ
2
∣∣∣∣KctKt − HcH
∣∣∣∣Qt ∀ c, (32)
equation (30) reduces to (18), i.e. regardless of whether trade imbalances are
present or not, the traded share of world output is the same as if trade were
balanced. The reason is simple: as long as trade imbalances are not so large as
to turn a country into a net importer or exporter of both intermediate goods
− that is, as long as (32) is satisfied − a trade surplus with α = 1/2 increases
a country’s exports by the same amount by which it reduces its imports (and
a trade deficit reduces its exports by the same amount by which it increases
its imports), leaving the sum of its exports and imports unchanged. In the
aggregate, therefore, the traded share of world output is unaffected by trade
imbalances. I will first analyse this special but familiar case, then proceed to
the more general case in which α 6= 1/2.
Assume α = 1/2 and (32) holds. It is now straightforward to determine the
conditions under which this sudden shift from financial autarky to financial
globalisation causes countries to trade more overall, namely:
∑
c
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(
Hcσ
2
c
H
∑
c′
1
σ2c′
)−1
− 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣ >
∑
c
∣∣∣sc
s
− 1
∣∣∣ . (33)
Financial globalisation increases trade if capital flows exacerbate any mismatch
between human and physical capital that existed under autarky, i.e. if differ-
ences in regional savings rates are small (sc ≈ s ∀ c), and country risk is
positively correlated with country size (Cov
{
σc,
Hc
H
}
> 0).
Suppose now that α 6= 1/2. The impact of financial globalisation on re-
gions’ production patterns will be as in the previous case. Yet even if (33) is
true, whether and by how much financial globalisation increases world trade
relative to financial autarky also depends on the value of α and the incidence
of trade surpluses and deficits. Without loss of generality, consider the case
in which α < 1/2. If deficit countries are capital-abundant on average and
surplus countries are labour-abundant, trade imbalances will cause financial
globalisation to increase global trade more than if α = 1/2. If deficit countries
are labour-abundant on average and surplus countries are capital-abundant,
financial globalisation increases global trade less.
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3 Calibrations
In this section I assess the extent to which factor-proportions differences can
explain the growth in world trade between 1980 and 2007 by taking the model
developed above to the data. Since the model only captures trade due to factor-
proportions differences − i.e. trade between capital-abundant and labour-
abundant countries − I calibrate it to match the empirical patterns of North-
South trade.
First, I let the model match the volume of North-South trade in 1980. I
then assess how much of the growth in this type of trade during the last 30
years it can explain, assuming that the world remains in financial autarky but
allowing for the opening up of China between 1980 an 2007. My calibration
predicts 70% of the growth in North-South trade between 1980 and 2007 −
50% of the overall growth in world trade. The predicted differential impact of
China’s opening on the trade of capital-abundant relative to labour-abundant
countries also appears to be of an empirically plausible magnitude.
Second, I allow for financial globalisation and show that, under the assump-
tion of fully integrated international asset markets, the model over-predicts
the growth in North-South trade. The reason turns out to be that countries’
model-implied capital stocks under the assumption of financial globalisation
are a poor match for their “true” capital stocks estimated from investment
data. Introducing country-specific foreign investment frictions allows me to
reconcile the model’s predictions with the data, while the implied size of these
investment frictions is strongly correlated with de jure and de facto measures
of countries’ financial openness. Under this assumption of partial financial
globalisation, the model can capture 87% of the growth in North-South trade
− and 60% of the overall growth in world trade.
3.1 Basic Data and Parameterisation
3.1.1 Data
The model of Section 2 is characterised by an overlapping-generations structure
and assumes full depreciation of capital between periods. To remain true to the
spirit of the theory, I treat the years 1980 and 2007 as consecutive periods of my
model. I use data for 27 large economies between 1980 and 2007, accounting for
85% of world GDP in this period. Their stocks of human and physical capital
are estimated in accordance with the methodology explained in Appendix A1,
which also provides a full list of countries’ estimated shares in the stocks of
world production factors. The main data sources for the construction of human
and physical capital stocks are Heston, Summers and Aten (2010) and Barro
21
and Lee (2010).
In the model, differences in factor proportions are the only reason for coun-
tries to trade goods internationally. Yet, it is clear that factor-proportions
trade can at best account for a fraction of global trade: Figure 2 shows that
bilateral trade between capital-abundant countries − which is entirely absent
from my model! − continues to account for the largest share of international
trade. Therefore, I assess my model only against its ability to predict the
growth in the subset of international trade flows it was designed to capture:
exports and imports between the capital-abundant “North” and the labour-
abundant “South”. Section 3.2.4 and Appendix A3 discuss the possibility of
incorporating North-North trade into my calibrations.
The empirical volume of North-South trade is measured as one half times
the observed volume of exports and imports between capital and labour-
abundant countries, where a country’s factor abundance is based on the es-
timated human and physical capital stocks. Data on aggregate trade flows
and country GDP is taken from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics and the
World Development Indicators, respectively.
3.1.2 Parameters
I assume that the world was in financial autarky in 1980,14 and that China
was completely closed off from international goods markets. Using (20), the
traded share of world output in 1980 is given by∑
c (|McK1980|+ |McH1980|)
2 (Q1980 +QChina,1980)
=
(1− τ)α(1−α)
∑
c
∣∣∣∣Kc1980K1980 − Hc1980H1980
∣∣∣∣
[
1 +
(
KChina,1980
K1980
)α(
HChina,1980
H1980
)1−α]−1
.
(34)
I let the capital share α = 0.33 as per convention and, to discipline the model,
use τ to match the ratio of North-South trade to world GDP in 1980. In the
model, τ represents the share of each country c’s income going to producers
of the non-traded final good, and we can think of it broadly as the share
of the non-traded sector in GDP. The calibrated value of τ is 0.75, which is
very close to the 1980 GDP-share of non-manufacturing value added for my
average sample country (0.76) − a common empirical proxy for the size of the
non-traded sector.
14This assumption is highly realistic as the absolute magnitude of international financial
flows between 1950 and 1980 was sufficiently small to have had almost no perceptible impact
on the patterns of capital accumulation among my sample countries.
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Source Parameter/Data 
Baseline 
Value  
   
α 0.33 - 
   
τ 0.75 Set to match the ratio of North-South trade to world GDP in 1980. 
   
σ2c - Average PRSG composite country risk score for 1980-2007. Listed in Appendix A1, Table A1. 
   
Hct - Size of the workforce times “quality adjustment” for the average number of years of education in the population of working age. For details, see Appendix A1. 
   
Kc1980 - 1980 capital stock constructed using the perpetual inventory method (first year: 1950) and investment data. For details, see Appendix A1. 
   
Kc2007 - 2007 capital stock constructed using the perpetual inventory method (starting from Kc1980) and investment data. For details, see Appendix A1. 
   
KFAc2007 - 2007 capital stock constructed using the perpetual inventory method (starting from Kc1980) and savings data year. For details, see Appendix A1. 
   
 
Table 1: Parameter Values and Data Sources
Table 1 summarises the key parameter values and data sources.
3.2 Opening Up of China
3.2.1 Calibration Results
Under the assumption of continued financial autarky, and without the opening
up of China, the model-predicted ratio of North-South trade to world GDP in
2007 is given by ∑
c (|McK2007|+ |McH2007|)
2 (Q2007 +QChina,2007)
=
(1− τ)α(1−α)
∑
c
∣∣∣∣KFAc2007K2007 − Hc2007H2007
∣∣∣∣
[
1 +
(
KFAChina,2007
K2007
)α(
HChina,2007
H2007
)1−α]−1
,
(35)
where
{
KFAc2007
}
c
represent countries’ capital stocks in 2007 under the assump-
tion of financial autarky. I construct these “financial autarky” capital stocks
using the perpetual inventory method but letting domestic investment equal
domestic savings between 1980 and 2007. A more detailed description of the
construction of
{
KFAc2007
}
c
is provided in Appendix A1.
As can be seen from Figure 5, the model predicts a modest increase North-
South trade relative to world GDP in this case, from 1.6% to 2.0%. Even in the
absence of China’s rise to global prominence and without international capi-
tal flows, growing differences between the capital-labour ratios of my sample
countries would have caused a modest increase in global trade. This diver-
gence of factor proportions alone can account for 10% of the overall increase
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in North-South trade relative to world GDP.
Retaining the assumption of financial autarky, but letting China join in-
ternational goods markets, the model-predicted ratio of North-South trade to
world GDP in 2007 is:∑
c (|McK2007|+ |McH2007|)
2Q2007
= (1− τ)α(1−α)
∑
c,China
∣∣∣∣KFAc2007K2007 − Hc2007H2007
∣∣∣∣ . (36)
The predicted ratio of North-South trade to world GDP in 2007 jumps to
4.1%, allowing the model to capture a full 70% of the expansion of North-
South trade (see Figure 5, dashed line). As the surge in North-South trade
since 1980 accounts for 70% of the rise in the traded share of output overall,
my factor-proportions model allows me to explain roughly half of the total
growth in world trade.
The exercise highlights the significance of China for any factor-proportions-
based view of international goods trade, which is due to its size and labour-
abundance: as Table A1 shows, China accounted for 36% of the human capital
among my sample countries in 2007, but only for 16% of their physical capital.
Aside from predicting a substantial share of the growth in North-South
trade since 1980, the model also accurately captures the patterns of North-
South trade for the largest economies: it predicts China’s trade with the North
in 2007 to be 1.4% of world GDP (Data: 1.3%), and the United States’, Japan’s
and Germany’s trade with the South to be 0.6% (Data: 1.0%), 0.5% (Data:
0.4%) and 0.2% (Data: 0.2%), respectively.
3.2.2 Impact on Other Labour-Abundant Countries
As discussed in Section 2.2, my model of factor-proportions trade shows that
the arrival of a labour-abundant country like China should increase the exports
and imports of previously capital-abundant countries relative to world GDP,
but reduce the exports and imports of countries which were previously very
labour-abundant. In Table 2, I explore the empirical validity of this prediction
with a difference-in-difference approach.
Using data for my set of large economies, Column 1 regresses the change in
countries’ exports and imports relative to world GDP between 1980 and 2007
on their average capital abundance for this period in the absence of China. The
purpose is to test whether there is evidence that the growth of countries’ trade
relative to world GDP was contingent on their capital abundance among the
group of initially open economies. The estimates presented in the first column
suggest that this was indeed the case: the coefficient on the capital-abundance
term is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. Moreover, as the
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 ΔTradec/WorldGDP ΔTradec/WorldGDP Tradect/WorldGDP 
Kc/K – Hc/H 0.028** 0.024*  
 (0.013) (0.013)  
(Kc/K – Hc/H)×TariffCHNt   -0.092*** 
   (0.029) 
Constant 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.006*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    
Country F.E.   Yes 
Year F.E.   Yes 
    
Period 1980-2007 1992-2007 1992-2007 
    
Adj. R2 0.12 0.09 0.98 
Observations     26 26 416 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
(Kc/K – Hc/H) represents country c's average capital abundance without China for the given period. TariffCHNt is China's average tariff rate. 
 
Table 2: Impact of China on Labour Abundant Countries − Regressions
estimated constant term is small but positive, the regression suggests that
marginally labour-abundant countries (0 ≥ Kc/K −Hc/H > −0.036) also ex-
perienced an increase in trade while very labour-abundant countries (−0.036 ≥
Kc/K − Hc/H) suffered a decline. This is consistent with the discussion in
Section 2.2.
A shortcoming of the regression in Column 1 is that it fails to tie the dif-
ferential change in trade directly to the opening up of China in this period. To
address this, I estimate a difference-in-difference panel regression in the third
column. The main variable of interest is an interaction term between countries’
average capital abundance without China and the Chinese average tariff rate,
as reported in the World Development Indicators. A negative coefficient would
indicate that tariff reductions in China increased the ratio of trade to world
GDP for capital-abundant countries relative to less capital-abundant regions.
The panel structure of the data allows me to employ country and time fixed
effects to control for all time-invariant heterogeneity across countries and for
possible global trends. Unfortunately, tariff data for China is only available
from the early 1990s, so the panel is restricted to the period 1992-2007.
Column 2 verifies that, just as in the period 1980-2007, the overall change in
trade relative to world GDP between 1992 and 2007 was larger for more capital-
abundant countries. Column 3 shows that the decline in China’s average tariff
in the latter period− by 25 percentage points overall− appears to have had the
expected differential effect on countries’ trade in accordance with their capital
abundance. In terms of magnitudes, the estimated coefficients in Column 3
would suggest that the opening of China in this period increased the import-
world GDP ratio for Japan − a very capital-abundant country − relative to
Indonesia − a very labour-abundant country − by 0.35 percentage points.
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In the calibrated model, China’s opening raises the import-world GDP
ratio for capital-abundant Japan relative to labour-abundant Indonesia by
0.25 percentage points. The model’s predictions concerning the differential
impact of China’s trade liberalisation on the group of open economies thus
appear to be both qualitatively and quantitatively plausible.
3.2.3 Evidence about Trading Patterns
A fundamental prediction of the model outlined in Section 2.1 is that differ-
ences in relative factor endowments can explain trading patterns in interna-
tional goods markets: countries with a large stock of installed physical capital
relative to their endowment of human capital will be exporters of relatively
capital-intensive products. There is a long literature which has attempted to
verify this proposition of factor-proportions models, with very mixed results.15
Typically, studies of the factor content of trade proceed by careful analysis
of countries’ trade and production patterns, using detailed data from economy-
wide input-output tables.16 As they tend to be extremely data intensive, there
is as yet little evidence about the factor content of trade in the first decade
of the 2000s, when China’s transition had started to gather pace. However,
basic evidence suggests that relative factor endowments have become a more
significant determinant of the type of goods imported by the United States
from its major trading partners. I present this evidence in Appendix A2.
3.2.4 North-North Trade
As noted above, my model only captures trade due to differences in factor
proportions and, as a result, would predict the volume of trade between coun-
tries with similar factor endowments − such as the economies of the capital-
abundant North − to be zero. In practice, North-North trade still represents
the largest share of international trade overall. To account for this stylised
fact, it would be necessary to incorporate additional motives for goods ex-
change into the theoretical framework developed in Section 2.
A natural way to do so would be to introduce trade in differentiated goods
which are produced under monopolistic competition in the spirit of the “new”
trade theory. This begs the question whether augmenting the model accord-
ingly would alter the expression for the volume of North-South trade and,
hence, invalidate the calibration results presented in this section. Appendix
A3 shows that this need not be the case: it provides a set of plausible as-
15See Helpman (1999) for a comprehensive survey.
16See Davis and Weinstein (2001) for a recent, careful empirical analysis confirming the
model’s prediction that countries export goods which use their abundant factors intensively.
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sumptions under which there is a positive volume of North-North trade in
differentiated varieties while the volume of North-South trade continues to be
described by equation (18). We can thus think of the calibrations here as
focusing on the North-South component of a more eclectic model of global
trade.
3.3 Financial Globalisation
3.3.1 Calibration Results
Let us now relax the assumption that there is no international asset trade
between 1980 and 2007 and assume, instead, that financial globalisation oc-
curred some time inbetween these two years. The model-predicted ratio of
North-South trade to world GDP in 2007 under full financial globalisation is
given by ∑
c (|McK2007|+ |McH2007|)
2Q2007
=
1
2
∑
c,China
∣∣∣∣∣∣(1− τ)α (1− α)
 1
σ2c
 ∑
c′,China
1
σ2c′
−1 − Hc2007
H2007
+ αNXc2007
Q2007
∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
1
2
∑
c,China
∣∣∣∣∣∣(1− τ)α (1− α)
 1
σ2c
 ∑
c′,China
1
σ2c′
−1 − Hc2007
H2007
− (1− α) NXc2007
Q2007
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ,
(37)
where country-level imbalances in North-South trade for the year 2007, {NXc2007}c,
are taken from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. To proxy for idiosyn-
cratic country risk, {σ2c}c, I use the average PRSG composite country risk
score for 1980-2007. These averages are reported in Table A1 of Appendix A1.
As illustrated in Figure 6, North-South trade rises to 6.5% of world GDP
in 2007 once fully integrated international asset market are assumed (dashed
line). In the light of the analysis of the model under full financial globalisation
in Section 2.3, the finding of a rise in trade due to financial integration in part
highlights an empirical mismatch between idiosyncratic country risk and hu-
man capital stocks, which causes the model to predict larger factor-endowment
differences as a result of international capital flows. This is consistent with
the evidence on “upstream” South-North capital flows reported in the Inter-
national Finance literature. However, the model now overpredicts the growth
in North-South trade in the last 30 years.
To determine why, I correlate country’s shares in the world capital stock as
predicted by the model under full globalisation with {Kc2007/K2007}c, where
{Kc2007}c is constructed using investment data between 1980 and 2007 and
28
ARG
ARG
US
AUS
T
AUT
BEL
BEL
A
BRA
CAN
CAN
H
CHL
CHN
DNK
DNK
FI
FIN
FRA
G R
GER
C
GRC
IDN
IDN
T
ITA
JP
JPN
KO
KOR
M X
MEX
NLD
NLD
Z
NZL
Z F
ZAF
ESP
ESP
SWE
SWE
T
THATUR
B
GBR
U
USA
0
0
.05
.0
5
1
.1
.1
5
2
.2
.2
5
ctual Share of World-K in 2007
Ac
tu
al 
Sh
ar
e 
of
 W
or
ld-
K 
in 
20
07
2
.02
3
.03
4
.04 .05
6
.06
Predicted Share of World-K under Complete Fin. Globalisation
Predicted Share of World-K under Complete Fin. Globalisation
otes:
Notes:
untries' model-predicted sha e f the world capital stock is based on their relative riskiness, as measured by
Countries' model-predicted share of the world capital stock is based on their relative riskiness, as measured by
their av rage composit  PRSG risk score. The correl tion is .1.
their average composite PRSG risk score. The correlation is .1.
Figure 7: Model-Implied and Actual Shares in the World Capital Stock
1.64
1.64
5 18
5.18
4 72
4.72
41
4.41
4.1
0
0
1
2
2
3
3
4
5
6
6
7
7
North-South Trade (% of World GDP)
No
rth
-S
ou
th
 T
ra
de
 (%
 o
f W
or
ld 
GD
P)
9 0
1980
5
1985
9
1990 1995
00
2000 2005 2010
Year
Year
Data
Data
M del (Fgn. Invest. Frict., alpha=1/3)
Model (Fgn. Invest. Frict., alpha=1/3)
2
Model (Fgn. Invest. Frict., alpha=1/2)
inancial Autarky)
Model (Financial Autarky)
Figure 8: Calibration Results - Financial Globalisation (θ 6= 0.50)
29
represents the standard estimate of a country’s stock of physical capital.17
Figure 7 plots the results. As is immediately evident, the fit is rather poor:
the correlation between the two variables is a mere 0.1. The model predicts
a smaller dispersion of capital stocks than is found in the data, and it assigns
unrealistically low shares in the global capital stock to the large economies of
the United States, China and Japan.
Upon second examination, this finding should come as no surprise. The
risk-investment regressions referred to in the Introduction (and described in
full in Appendix A2), highlight the continued importance of domestic savings
as a determinant of domestic investment. In accordance with these findings,
economies with a larger pool of domestic savings would be expected to have
larger capital stocks for a given level of country risk. By contrast, in the bench-
mark model in Section 2.3 domestic savings play no role at all in determining
investment in financially open economies. Thus, the model underpredicts the
share of the world capital stock located in the largest economies
3.3.2 Partial Financial Globalisation
The reason the model predicts countries’ shares in the global stock of capital
poorly − and the reason it overpredicts the growth of trade under financial
globalisation − is that I have taken an extreme view of financial globalisation
so far: trading in foreign assets is no more costly than buying or selling do-
mestic assets for agents in a given c. Suppose, instead, that for each unit of
spending by an agent in c on assets from region c′ 6= c, the agent can only
appropriate the returns to 1− fc units of the foreign asset.18 This additional
cost of foreign asset purchases reduces the expected returns from, and hence
the relative attractiveness of, foreign assets and causes a “home bias” in in-
vestment portfolios. As a result, the optimal investment portfolio is no longer
universal, and it can be shown that for agents in c
φcc′ = max
 1σ2c′
(∑
c′
1
σ2c′
)−1(
1− fc
γσ2c
)
, 0
 ∀ c′ 6= c, (38)
φcc = 1−
∑
c′ 6=c
φcc′ . (39)
17Note that national accounting identities imply that investment equals savings plus the
current account − so that {Kc2007}c accounts for net international asset trades in the pat-
terns of capital accumulation.
18One could think of fc as a tax on foreign transactions by c’s government, or an agency
or information cost specific to c which is higher for foreign than for domestic investments.
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 fc Capital Account Restrictions, Schindler (2009) 
Avg. |CAct/GDPct|, 
1980-2007 
GFAct/GDPct, 
2007 
     
     
fc 1.0000    
Capital Account Restrictions, 
Schindler (2009) 0.4415 1.0000   
Avg. |CAct/GDPct|, 
1980-2007 -0.2690 0.1418 1.0000  
GFAct/GDPct, 
2007 -0.5231 -0.5769 -0.1698 1.0000 
 
Table 3: Model-Implied Foreign Investment Friction and Measures of Fin. Openness
If fc ≥ θσ2c , agents in c will choose not to purchase foreign assets at all.
If fc → 0, (38) and (39) approach the optimal frictionless world portfolio
described by equation (26). An immediate implication of (38) and (39) is that
the higher the average fc (and hence the average φcc), the greater the role for
domestic savings as a determinant of domestic investments.
Introducing a set of financial frictions permits me to use {σ2c}c from the
data and set {fc}c to match {Kc2007/K2007}c. As agents now face a risk-
return trade-off, I need to specify a value for γ, the coefficient of relative risk
aversion. In line with the RBC literature, I let γ = 2. With the introduction
of foreign investment frictions, the model no longer overpredicts the rise in
North-South trade relative to world GDP. Nevertheless, allowing for partial
financial globalisation means the model can explain an additional 17% of the
expansion in North-South trade, and 87% overall (see Figure 6, dotted line).
This suggests that a significant portion of the expansion of trade between
capital-abundant and labour-abundant countries in the last three decades may
be the result of the observed net capital flows towards the global North.
This leaves the question whether the model’s new implications for financial
openness are more consistent with empirical reality than the capital stocks
implied by the frictionless model. I turns out that the system of 27 equations
described by
Kc2007
K2007
=
C∑
c′=1
φc
′
c ({fc}c)
has a unique interior solution in which fc ≥ 0 for all c. The resulting set
of model-implied financial frictions provides an inverse measure of financial
openness for my sample countries: the smaller fc, the more open is c to foreign
asset trade.
Table 3 correlates the model-implied foreign investment frictions with one
de jure and two de facto measure of countries’ financial openness. It shows
that the set of implied frictions is strongly positively correlated with the index
of capital account restrictions by Schindler (2009), negatively correlated with
a countries’ average absolute current account share in GDP and strongly neg-
atively correlated with their foreign asset holdings relative to GDP. All in all,
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assuming that financial globalisation allows agents to hedge idiosyncratic in-
vestment risk subject to country-specific foreign investment frictions allows me
to match the patterns of international financial integration remarkably well.
3.3.3 The Role of Trade Imbalances
So far I have set α = 0.33. As a result, there are two channels through which
financial globalisation may impact on the global trade share in the model:
i) by increasing factor endowment differences and ii) through the existence
and incidence of trade imbalances. In this section I analyse how much of the
model-predicted effect of financial globalisation on world trade is due to the
latter.
I proceed by setting α = 0.5. Since I continue to assume that the world was
in financial autarky in 1980 and choose τ to match the ratio of North-South
trade to world GDP in 1980, this only alters the the ratio of North-South
trade to world GDP in 2007. Specifically, as explained in Section 2.3.4, this
ratio should now be unaffected by the presence of trade imbalances in 2007 as
long as equation (30) is satisfied for my sample countries. It is easily verified
that this is the case given the country-level imbalances in North-South trade,
{NXc2007}c, from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics.
As can be seen from Figure 8 (dotted line), setting α = 0.5 reduces the
share of North-South trade growth due to financial globalisation in the model
approximately by one half. Overall, the model now captures 80% of the ex-
pansion of North-South trade, amounting to 54% of the total growth in world
trade. According to the model, therefore, the presence of trade imbalances has
had a significant impact on the overall volume of trade.
The reason for this impact is as follows. With α < 0.50, a trade deficit
increases domestic demand for capital-intensive products less than for labour-
intensive products. Conversely, a trade surplus decreases domestic demand
for capital-intensive products less than for labour-intensive products. Conse-
quently, if deficit countries are − on average − capital-abundant and surplus
countries labour-abundant, trade imbalances will increase global trade. The
increase in trade growth due to trade imbalances is thus largely the result of the
substantial North-South trade deficit of the United States in 2007 (amounting
to 0.71% of world GDP) and the sizable North-South trade surplus of China
(about 0.78% of world GDP). If, on the other hand, α > 0.50 had been cho-
sen, the pattern would be reversed: the model would predict the observed
pattern of trade surpluses and deficits to reduce North-South trade, and it
would predict a smaller portion of recent trade growth.
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4 Summary and Conclusion
In this paper I document that a classical model of comparative advantage
due to differences in countries’ relative endowments of production factors can
explain most of the recent growth of world trade. This largely reflects a rise
in the volume of trade between countries with very different capital-labour
ratios but also, to a significant extent, a pattern of international capital flows
which has exacerbated factor-proportions differences, increasing the incentives
for interindustry trade. My model and calibrations highlight that the growing
prevalence of factor-proportions trade may explain why financial globalisation
has taken this unexpected turn: if international commodity trade reduces
factor-return differentials − a well-established prediction of factor-proportions
models −, the importance of country risk as a determinant of international
investment patterns is enhanced. Net financial flows to relatively safe countries
may drive capital-labour ratios further apart if these countries also account for
a small portion of the world’s effective workforce.
Throughout the paper I have focused exclusively on factor-proportions dif-
ferences as a motive for countries to engage in goods trade. Adopting this
perspective has allowed me to highlight its relevance for understanding some
important recent features of globalisation. Yet there are others which it cannot
capture adequately.
Figure 2 highlights the continued concentration of a large share of interna-
tional trade among a small group of relatively similar and aﬄuent countries.
By most accounts, this portion of global trade is better explained by the scale
economies of new trade theory than by differences in countries’ capital-labour
ratios. My evidence on the importance of factor-proportions differences for
the growth of world trade since 1980 does not preclude any role for new trade
motives in explaining rises in the traded share of world output. Helpman’s
(1987) original argument that increased income similarity across countries
should cause greater volumes of trade has had little quantitative traction be-
cause the world income distribution has remained remarkably stable during
most of the post-War era.19 However, high growth rates in China and other
developing countries may yet cause the world income distribution to narrow,
opening the door to another channel through which their transition should
affect the expansion of global trade.
My paper investigates the growth of world trade over a thirty-year pe-
riod. Yet its unexpectedly large decline, and subsequent recovery, during the
downturn of 2008-2009 has also renewed interest in the causes of short-run
19See, for example, Acemoglu and Ventura (2002).
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fluctuations in global trade flows. A pure factor-proportions model is unsuited
to analysing this issue as factor endowments evolve over the span of decades,
rather than years. Explaining the responsiveness of trade flows to the global
business cycle requires a careful investigation of the transmission of real and
financial shocks in the world economy for a given pattern of comparative ad-
vantage. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the existing literature on inter-
national business cycles has relied on a very specific set of assumptions about
the motives for trade.20 My findings suggest that a more eclectic theoretical
approach to international goods exchange may well enhance the ability of in-
ternational business cycle models to predict the short-run patterns of trade
and capital flows among an increasingly heterogenous set of open economies.
I have attributed a large share of the recent growth of world trade to
the transition of China, and to financial globalisation which has given rise to
the observed pattern of capital flows towards capital-abundant countries. As
neither of these processes is concluded, this paper is unlikely to prove the last
word on their importance for the patterns of specialisation and global trade
flows. Both will continue to shape the international economy for some time to
come.
20Following Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1994), papers in this literature tend to assume
Armington trade in intermediate goods which are aggregated by means of a CES production
into a composite final good,
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Appendix A1 - Factor Endowment Data
Factor endowment data is constructed in close correspondence with the method-
ology of the development accounting data, surveyed in Caselli (2005).
I generate estimates of capital stocks in 1980 using the perpetual inventory
equation
Kct = Ict + (1− δ)Kct−1,
where It is gross investment in country c at t and δ is the constant depreciation
rate. Investment data in constant, PPP-adjusted 2005 $ is taken from Heston,
Summers and Aten (2009) and, in line with convention, I set δ = .06. I start in
the year 1950 and, following standard practice, compute Kc1950 as Ic1950gIc+δ where
gIc is the average geometric growth rate of the investment series. However,
the choice of Kc1950 is immaterial since it has little impact on the estimated
capital stock in 1980 with a depreciation rate of 6%.
To construct capital stocks in 2007 in the counterfactual scenario of finan-
cial autarky, KFAc2007, I start from the estimated capital stock in 1980 and use an
augmented version of the perpetual inventory equation for subsequent years,
KFAct = Sct + (1− δ)KFAct−1,
where Sct are gross domestic savings in country c at t. The reasoning behind
this new equation is as follows: from the national accounting identities,
Sct = Ict + CAct,
where CAct is country c’s current account at t, so Ict = Sct in financially
closed economies. Assuming constant savings rates, the set of counterfactual
capital stocks thus provides a benchmark against which the impact of net
international financial flows on the observed pattern of capital accumulation
can be judged.21 Sct is constructed using the aforementioned investment series
as well as data on the current account (as a percentage of GDP) from the IMF
International Financial Statistics (2010). The “true” capital stocks in 2007,
Kc2007, which incorporate the impact of the observed pattern of international
capital flows, are constructed as those for the year 1980, i.e. using investment
instead of savings flows.
21The assumption that countries’ observed savings rates would have been the same in
counterfactual financial autarky may seem contentious because, in practice, the occurrence
of financial globalisation is likely to have affected countries’ interest rates. However, there
is a large number of studies suggesting that the interest elasticity of savings is close to
zero, both in advanced economies − see, for example, Blinder (1975, 1981), Mankiw (1981),
Campbell and Mankiw (1989, 1991) − and in developing countries − see Giovannini (1983).
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Finally, I estimate the stock of human capital based on the size of the
working-age population, using total population figures from Heston, Summers
and Aten (2009) and multiplying with the population share of individuals be-
tween 15 and 65 from the World Development Indicators (2010). The “quality
adjustment” follows Hall and Jones (1999):
Hct = e
f(dct)Lct,
where Lct is the working-age population and dct is its average number of years
of schooling in country c at t. The function f() is piecewise linear with
f(dct) =

0.134 · dct if dct ≤ 4
0.101 · (dct − 4) + 0.134 · 4 if 4 < dct ≤ 8
0.068 · (dct − 8) + 0.101 · 4 + 0.134 · 4 if 8 < dct
,
and dct is based on the average years of schooling in the population above
the age of 15 from Barro and Lee (2010).22 Average years of schooling are
observed quinquennially, most recently in 2010. Since dct moves slowly over
time, a quinquennial observation can plausibly be employed for nearby dates
as well.
Throughout the paper I assume that the accumulation of physical capital
is affected by international financial flows, but the accumulation of human
capital is not.
22The paper’s key empirical findings are, if anything, strengthened if population or the
size of the workforce are used instead of the “quality adjusted” workforce to measure human
capital endowments.
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Country Data 
       
       
 (Hc/H)1980 (Kc/K)1980 (Hc/H)2007 (Kc/K)2007 (KFAc/K)2007 Avg. PRSG Score 
       
       
Argentina .014 .016 .013 .009 .009 37.63 
Australia .010 .017 .009 .018 .015 18.97 
Austria .004 .001 .003 .007 .007 14.50 
Belgium .006 .012 .004 .009 .010 17.75 
Brazil .035 .032 .056 .022 .021 36.71 
Canada .016 .026 .013 .025 .026 15.74 
Chile .005 .004 .006 .005 .005 28.34 
China .366 .035 .426 .159 .185 28.99 
Denmark .003 .006 .002 .005 .005 14.56 
Finland .003 .006 .002 .004 .005 14.68 
France .025 .064 .022 .044 .045 19.81 
Germany .035 .111 .033 .062 .067 16.47 
Greece .005 .011 .004 .007 .005 30.31 
Indonesia .049 .008 .057 .015 .016 40.04 
Italy .027 .063 .019 .046 .045 21.59 
Japan .074 .150 .049 .125 .136 13.70 
Korea, Rep. .021 .010 .021 .034 .035 22.96 
Mexico .022 .027 .034 .023 .022 31.53 
Netherlands .009 .018 .006 .012 .015 13.29 
New Zealand .002 .003 .002 .002 .002 18.54 
South Africa .011 .006 .015 .004 .004 32.61 
Spain .017 .035 .015 .033 .029 23.02 
Sweden .005 .009 .004 .006 .006 15.53 
Thailand .016 .008 .019 .014 .015 19.55 
Turkey .014 .007 .020 .010 .009 42.55 
U.K. .031 .044 .021 .035 .033 17.86 
U.S. .174 .262 .125 .265 .231 18.37 
       
 
Table A1: Shares of World Factor Endowments, 1980 and 2007
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Appendix A2 - Empirical Appendix
A2.1 Investment and Country Risk
Differences in country-specific investment risk play a crucial role in the view
of international asset trade proposed in this paper. In order to provide a
preliminary assessment of the significance of country risk as a determinant of
investment patterns among financially open economies, I estimate a regression
of the form
Investmt.ct/GDPct = β0 + β1Savingsct/GDPct + β2Riskct + δc + δt + εct,
where Investmt.ct, Savingsct and GDPct are, respectively, investment, savings
and GDP in country c and year t, Riskct is a measure of country risk, and
δc and δt represent country and time fixed effects. Note that, as a matter of
national accounting, we should obtain β1 = 1, β2 = 0 if all sample countries
are completely closed to international financial flows.
To construct the panel, I take the three macroeconomic series for 27 largest
economies between 1980 and 2007 from the World Development Indicators
(2010). As a measure of country-specific investment risk, I use the composite
country risk index compiled by the Political Risk Services Group (PRSG). This
index ranks countries by their economic, financial and political risk based on
PRSG’s own macroeconomic analysis as well as surveys among international
investment professionals. There are two main advantages to using the PRSG
ranking in this context. First, it is compiled monthly, so an annual risk score
can easily be constructed by taking the average over the corresponding 12-
month period. Second, it largely captures countries’ idiosyncratic investment
risk, as emphasised by the model in Section 2.
Dep. Variable: 
Investmentct/GDPct (%) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Savingsct/GDPct (%)  0.487***  0.433*** 
  (0.037)  (0.046) 
Risk indexct (0-100)   -0.195*** -0.177*** 
   (0.026) (0.027) 
     
Country F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Adj. R2 0.67 0.76 0.75 0.79 
Observations 743 743 608 608 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Period: 1980-2007 
 Table A2: Investment and Country Risk
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Table A2 reports the regression results. The first noteworthy finding ap-
pears in column 2. The estimated coefficient on Savingsct/GDPct − some-
times referred to as the “savings retention” coefficient − is around .5. This
relatively low value suggests a high degree of financial globalisation.23 The
estimated value of this coefficient is almost unchanged when country risk is
added to the regression in column (3). The country risk score itself is shown
to be associated with significantly lower investment shares of GDP. Moreover,
the economic impact of changes in country risk is substantial: an improvement
in the average risk score from the 75th percentile of the country distribution
(30) to the 25th percentile (16) would raise the average investment share by
2.6 percentage points. By way of comparison, an increase in the average sav-
ings rate from the 25th percentile of the country distribution (21%) to the
75th percentile (26%) would only raise the investment share by 2.2 percentage
points.
A2.1 Specialisation
Are factor-proportions an important determinant of the type of goods im-
ported by the United States from its main trading partners? This question has
generated a large empirical literature, which is surveyed in Helpman (1999). A
basic test on U.S. bilateral trade flows, which can be motivated by augmenting
the model in Section 2, does suggest this to be the case in recent decades.
As is, the model in Section 2 does not deliver predictions for countries’
bilateral trading patterns. To derive a testable prediction, let us make an
additional assumption about the nature of international trade.24 Suppose a
fraction µ ∈ (0, 1) of trade transactions proceeds as follows. Producers in each
industry put their outputs into a world pool for their industry, and consumers
choose randomly their desired levels of consumption from these pools. By the
law of large numbers, the expected share of goods of a given type produced by
country c and used in consumption and investment of another country − call
it UnitedStates − will be equal to share of c′s production in global production
of the good. For the remaining share 1− µ of goods produced and consumed
international trade proceeds as describe in Section 2.1.
Define the average capital intensity of c′s exports to the United States at
t as
AKXUnitedStatesct =
∑
j
αj
MUnitedStatescjt
MUnitedStatesct
, (40)
23Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) estimate savings retention coefficients as one of several
possible measures of financial globalisation for different time periods. Using a similar sample
of countries, they report a coefficient of .83 for 1946-1972, and .75 for 1973-2000
24This assumption was first suggested by Deardorff (1998).
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on the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database. For data description and regression results, see text.
Figure A1: Capital-Labour Ratios and Specialisation
where MUnitedStatescjt are U.S. imports from country c in industry j at time t,
and MUnitedStatesct are total U.S. imports from c at t. Then, according to the
model,
AKXUnitedStatesct =
αK
QcKt
QKt
θ + αH
QcHt
QHt
(1− θ)
QcKt
QKt
θ + QcHt
QHt
(1− θ) =
αKct
Hct
αKct
Hct
+ (1− α) Kt
Ht
. (41)
Equation (40) shows that, at a given time t, we should expect a positive
correlation between a country’s capital-labour ratio and the capital-intensity
of its exports to the United States.25 Below, I verify that this prediction is
borne out by U.S. sector-level trading patterns in recent years.
To calculate U.S. sectoral import shares, I use sector-level data on imports
from the U.S. Census, assembled and converted to the 4-digit level of SIC
by Feenstra (2009). The data I employ covers U.S. imports from 26 large
economies in more than 400 distinct sectors.
I construct an index of capital intensity at the 4-digit level of SIC from
data provided in the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database. In line
with previous papers, I rank industries by the average non-wage share of U.S.
25Romalis (2004) derives a similar expression under different assumptions and successfully
tests it for a cross-section of countries.
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manufacturing value added in the period 1958 to 2005. This ranking, nor-
malised between 0 and 1, is taken as a measure of capital intensity. Note that
this amounts to assuming that the technological capital intensity measured for
the United States in a given sector i is a good description of the properties of
this sector’s production function for any country. This standard assumption
is made partly for reasons of empirical convenience − as detailed sector-level
manufacturing data would not be available for all countries in the given sam-
ple −, and partly because U.S. product and factor markets are considered to
be among the world’s most competitive and frictionless, so that the relative
usage of capital and labour in U.S. manufacturing is most likely to reflect
the true technological properties of different industries, rather than allocative
distortions.
Finally, country shares in world physical and human capital are calculated
on the basis of the physical-capital and human-capital estimates discussed in
Appendix A1.
Figure A1 plots the correlation between the average capital intensity of
countries’ exports to the United States and their K/H-ratio for the years
1985, 1995, 2000 and 2005. The graphs document that capital-labour ratios
do appear to have been positively correlated with the average capital intensity
of exports to the United States. Indeed, in 2005 factor-proportions differences
accounted for approximately 30% of the differences in the average capital in-
tensity of U.S. imports from its major trading partners.
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Appendix A3 - Theoretical Appendix
Suppose the model is as described in Section 2.1, but replace equation (4) with
Qct = θ
{[ˆ Jt
0
qcKt(j)
ε−1
ε dj
]β ε
ε−1
Q1−βcKt
}α
Q1−αcHt with α, β ∈ (0, 1) . (42)
The production of final goods now also requires a set of differentiated varieties
ofK-intermediates, with ε > 1 representing the substitution elasticity between
varieties and Jt denoting the (endogenous) mass of such inputs available at
time t. Differentiated inputs are produced under monopolistic competition
according to the production function
qct(j) = max {kct(j)− f, 0} . (43)
As in Section 2, the assumptions about tradability and production tech-
nologies ensure that goods trade equalises the price of the final good as well
as factor returns. Producers of differentiated intermediates enter the global
market with a unique variety and optimally charge a price equal to a fixed
mark-up over their marginal cost,
pct(j) =
ε
ε− 1rt ≡ pt, (44)
while free entry reduces the profits of monopolistic intermediate producers to
zero, yielding
qct(j) = (ε− 1) f ≡ q. (45)
Market clearing then requires that
Jt =
β
εf
Kt. (46)
Let us divide regions into two sets:
Nt =
{
c ∈ C
∣∣∣∣KctKt ≥ HcH
}
St =
{
c ∈ C
∣∣∣∣KctKt < HcH
}
,
where Nt ∪ St = C and Nt ∩ St = Ø. I now introduce two additional as-
sumptions. First, all c ∈ Nt have an infinitessimal productivity advantage in
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differentiated K-intermediates. Second,
β ≤
∑
c∈Nt
Kct
Kt
. (47)
Defining Jct has the mass of differentiated varieties produced in c at t, the
assumption about productivities ensures that
Jct = 0 ∀ c ∈ St.
Meanwhile, Jct is indeterminate ∀ c ∈ Nt, with
∑
c∈Nt Jct = Jt.
We can now derive a new expression for the traded share of world output,
assuming balanced trade for simplicity:∑
c∈C (Mct +Xct)
2Qt
= (1− τ)
[
β
∑
c∈Nt
Qct
Qt
(
1− Jct
Jt
)
+ α (1− α)
∑
c∈C
∣∣∣∣KctKt − HcH
∣∣∣∣
]
.
(48)
The first term represents North-North trade in differentiated K-intermediates.
Its size depends on Northern regions’ respective shares in global output, and
their shares in the total production of the differentiated goods. The second
term represents North-South trade. As in Section 2, North-South trade arises
purely due to factor-proportions differences. Equation (48) demonstrates that
it is straightforward to account for the large observed volume of North-North
in my model while keeping my main expression for the volume of North-South
trade unchanged.
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